different conceptions of the relationship between organized religion and natural philosophy, as well as to conflicting evaluations of the relation between knowledge and fact.
Shapin and Schaffer have directed attention to a capital problem in the historiography ofearly modern science: the creation of a sustained practice of experimental natural philosophy. It is not a new problem. To go back no further than 1971, Joseph Ben-David then emphasized that the success of what he indiscriminately called "scientists" in obtaining social acceptance for their claims to knowledge and thereby a role in society needed explanation; and he dated the first full-dress staging of the role to Restoration England. Shapin and Schaffer have gone far beyond Ben-David in the detail of their reading of the texts and in the intricacy of their argument. They show that Boyle and his group shouldered a burden of proof when they claimed that the matter of fact should be the basis of their science and their ethics. It was the old question of the hierarchy of knowledge: natural philosophy and its practitioners had a place in the schools, and hence in society; to challenge them-not necessarily to replace them-required mobilization of more than a few bits of contrived experience interpreted as contradictory to traditional ideas.
In this last connection Shapin and Schaffer's representation of Boyle's group as assertive and expansive, as missionaries of the model method for all social transactions, rings false. They write (p. 340): "The experimentalists' task was to show others that their problems could be solved if they came to the experimental philosopher and to the space he occupied in Restoration culture." But, as they also emphasize, it was just these problems-social problems-that the Royal Society excluded from its "space". Their claim that, because Boyle and his followers advocated application of the results of their investigations to the support of religion, "their laboratories acquired a sacred status" (p. 319), should also be put down to over-enthusiasm.
The enthusiasts provide much information of value even to those who may doubt the reach of their analogy between politics and natural philosophy. Their concept of literary and social technologies in the practice of experimental science deserves refinement and extension. Their account of the difficulties Boyle's contemporaries experienced in reproducing his experiments and even in making air-pumps deserves study by all historians of science. Assent to new experimental findings requires their replication, or at least a belief in the practicability of replication; but repetition and confirmation, always problematic to some degree, become suspect where the technology involved is new or exotic, or when only a single machine capable of producing the new effects exists, or when copies of the competent machine can only be made to work by people who had practised on the original. These problems were not peculiar to the seventeenth century: the difficulties of replication, the unique machine, and the need for immediate experience with it to reproduce it, recur in modern particle physics. And finally, among the parts of Leviathan and the air-pump of utility apart from interpretation, is Schaffer's translation of Hobbes's response to Boyle, the Dialogusphysicus of 1661 and 1668, presented in English for the first time.
On the debit side, Leviathan has swollen so large that, as is usual with books on British natural philosophy, it has no room for relevant parallels from Europe. That is a pity. The Society's policy against conjecturing about causes, which Hooke wished to raise to the status of a by-law, also informed the practice of the Florentine Accademia del Cimento; and Boyle's second technology, the witnessing of experiments by trustworthy observers, was common procedure in Florence, at Athanasius Kircher's "museum" at the Collegio Romano in Rome, in the various groups that anticipated the Paris Academy of Sciences, and elsewhere. This is not to impugn the reasons Shapin and Schaffer bring to explain the practices of the Royal Society of London, but to suggest that what was peculiar to the British case can only be discovered by comparing it with parallel happenings on the Continent.
Shapin and Schaffer convey their intricate story and lesson clearly apart from a little jargon that does not always translate easily. They conduct us through "social spaces"; "disciplinary spaces"; "physical space"; "abstract space", where "virtual witnesses", i.e. readers of Boyle's books, "could effectively be mobilized" (p. 336); and, of course through space void of air. This spissitude bamboozles even its creators. "For Hobbes", they write, "the rejection of vacuum was the elimination of a space within which dissension could take place" (p. 109).
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